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true。
And so I very clearly recognise that the certainty and
truth of all knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the
true God； in so much that； before I knew Him； I could not have
a perfect knowledge of any other thing。 And now that I know
Him I have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of an
infinitude of things； not only of those which relate to God
Himself and other intellectual matters； but also of those
which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is the
object of pure mathematics ＇which have no concern with whether
it exists or not＇。
Meditation VI。
Of the Existence of Material Things； and of the real
distinction between the Soul and Body of Man。
Nothing further now remains but to inquire whether
material things exist。 And certainly I at least know that
these may exist in so far as they are considered as the
objects of pure mathematics； since in this aspect I perceive
them clearly and distinctly。 For there is no doubt that God
possesses the power to produce everything that I am capable of
perceiving with distinctness； and I have never deemed that
anything was impossible for Him； unless I found a
contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly。 Further；
the faculty of imagination which I possess； and of which；
experience tells me； I make use when I apply myself to the
consideration of material things； is capable of persuading me
of their existence； for when I attentively consider what
imagination is； I find that it is nothing but a certain
application of the faculty of knowledge to the body which is
immediately present to it； and which therefore exists。
And to render this quite clear； I remark in the first
place the difference that exists between the imagination and
pure intellection ＇or conception23＇。 For example； when I
imagine a triangle； I do not conceive it only as a figure
prehended by three lines； but I also apprehend24 these
three lines as present by the power and inward vision of my
mind；25 and this is what I call imagining。 But if I desire to
think of a chiliagon； I certainly conceive truly that it is a
figure posed of a thousand sides； just as easily as I
conceive of a triangle that it is a figure of three sides
only； but I cannot in any way imagine the thousand sides of a
chiliagon ＇as I do the three sides of a triangle＇； nor do I；
so to speak； regard them as present ＇with the eyes of my
mind＇。 And although in accordance with the habit I have
formed of always employing the aid of my imagination when I
think of corporeal things； it may happen that in imagining a
chiliagon I confusedly represent to myself some figure； yet it
is very evident that this figure is not a chiliagon； since it
in no way differs from that which I represent to myself when I
think of a myriagon or any other many…sided figure； nor does
it serve my purpose in discovering the properties which go to
form the distinction between a chiliagon and other polygons。
But if the question turns upon a pentagon； it is quite true
that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon
without the help of my imagination； but I can also imagine it
by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five
sides； and at the same time to the space which they enclose。
And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular
effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination； such
as I do not require in order to understand； and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference
which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26
I remark besides that this power of imagination which is
in one； inasmuch as it differs from the power of
understanding； is in no wise a necessary element in my nature；
or in ＇my essence； that is to say； in＇ the essence of my mind；
for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever
remain the same as I now am； from which it appears that we
might conclude that it depends on something which differs from
me。 And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which
my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can
apply itself to consider it when it pleases； it may be that by
this means it can imagine corporeal objects； so that this mode
of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as
mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on
itself； and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in
itself； while in imagining it turns towards the body； and
there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it
has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses。 I
easily understand； I say； that the imagination could be thus
constituted if it is true that body exists； and because I can
discover no other convenient mode of explaining it； I
conjecture with probability that body does exist； but this is
only with probability； and although I examine all things with
care； I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea
of corporeal nature； which I have in my imagination； I can
derive any argument from which there will necessarily be
deduced the existence of body。
But I am in the habit of imagining many other things
besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure
mathematics； to wit； the colours； sounds； scents； pain； and
other such things； although less distinctly。 And inasmuch as
I perceive these things much better through the senses； by the
medium of which； and by the memory； they seem to have reached
my imagination； I believe that； in order to examine them more
conveniently； it is right that I should at the same time
investigate the nature of sense perception； and that I should
see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of
thought； which I call feeling； I cannot derive some certain
proof of the existence of corporeal objects。
And first of all I shall recall to my memory those
matters which I hitherto held to be true； as having perceived
them through the senses； and the foundations on which my
belief has rested； in the next place I shall examine the
reasons which have since obliged me to place them in doubt； in
the last place I shall consider which of them I must now
believe。
First of all； then； I perceived that I had a head； hands；
feet； and all other members of which this body￥which I
considered as a part； or possibly even as the whole； of
myself￥is posed。 Further I was sensible that this body was
placed amidst many others； from which it was capable of being
affected in many different ways； beneficial and hurtful； and I
remarked that a certain feeling of pleasure acpanied those
that were beneficial； and pain those which were harmful。 And
in addition to this pleasure and pain； I also experienced
hunger； thirst； and other similar appetites； as also certain
corporeal inclinations towards joy； sadness； anger； and other
similar passions。 And outside myself； in addition to
extension； figure； and motions of bodies； I remarked in them
hardness； heat； and all other tactice qualities； and； further；
light and colour； and scents and sounds； the variety of which
gave me the means of distinguishing the sky； the earth； the
sea； and generally all the other bodies； one from the other。
And certainly； considering the ideas of all these qualities
which presented themselves to my mind； and which alone I
perceived properly or immediately； it was not without reason
that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different
from my thought； to wit； bodies from which those ideas
proceeded； for I found by experience that these ideas
presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite；
so that I could not perceive any object； however desirous I
might be； unless it were present to the organs of sense； and
it was not in my power not to perceive it； when it was
present。 And because the ideas which I received through the
senses were much more lively； more clear； and even； in their
own way； more distinct than any of those which I could of
myself frame in meditation； or than those I found impressed on
my memory； it appeared as though they could not have proceeded
from my mind； so that they must necessarily have been produced
in me by some other things。 And having no knowledge of those
objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves
gave me； nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that
the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused。 And
because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of
my senses rather than my reason； and recognised that the ideas
which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I
perceived through the senses； and that they were most
frequently even posed of portions of these last； I
persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which
had not formerly e to me through the senses。 Nor was it
without some reason that I believed that this body （which be a
certain special right I call my own） belonged to me more
properly and more strictly than any other； for in fact I could
never be separated from it as from other bodies； I experienced
in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections；
and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the
titillation of pleasure in its parts； and not in the parts of
other bodies which were separated from it。 But when I
inquired； why； from some； I know not what； painful sensation；
there follows sadness of mind； and from the pleasurable
sensation there arises joy； or why this mysterious pinching of
the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat；
and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink； and so on； I
could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so； for
there is certainly no affinity （that I at least can
understand） between the craving of the stomach and the desire
to eat； any more than between the perception of whatever
causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this
perception。 And in the same way it appeared to me that I had
learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed
regarding the objects of my senses； since I remarked that
these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to
weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make
them。
But afterwards many experiences little by little
destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses； for I
from time to time observed that those towers which from afar
appeared to me to be round； more closely observed seemed
square； and that colossal statues raised on the summit of
these towers； appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from
the bottom； and so in an infinitude of other cases I found
error in judgments founded on the external senses。 And not
only in those founded on the external senses； but even in
those founded on the internal as well； for is there anything
more intimate or more internal than pain？ And yet I have
learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut
off； that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which
had been amputated； which made me think that I could not be
quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me；
even although I felt pain in it。 And to those grounds of
doubt I have lately added two others； which are very general；
the first is that I never have believed myself to feel
anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes
believe myself to feel when I sleep； and as I do not think
that these things which I seem to feel in sleep； proceed from
objects outside of me； I do not see any reason why I should
have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive
while awake。 The other was that being still ignorant； or
rather supposing myself to be ignorant； of the author of my
being； I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so
constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters
which seemed to me to be most certain。 And as to the grounds
on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible
objects； I had not much trouble in replying to them。 For
since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things
from which reason repelled me； I did not believe that I should
trust much to the teachings of nature。 And