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over 30％ during the previous decade。 The best performer among the 1000 was merce Clearing House at 40。2％。
若把这七家公司视作是单一个体公司，则税后净利约为一亿美元，股东权益投资报酬率更将高达57％，即使财务杠杆再高，你也很难在一般公司看到这种比率，根据财星杂志在1988年出版的投资人手册，在全美五百大制造业与五百大服务业中，只有六家公司过去十年的股东权益报酬率超过30％，最高的一家也不过只有40。2％。
Of course； the returns that Berkshire earns from these seven units are not as high as their underlying returns because； in aggregate； we bought the businesses at a substantial premium to underlying equity capital。 Overall； these operations are carried on our books at about 222 million above the historical accounting values of the underlying assets。 However； the managers of the units should be judged by the returns they achieve on the underlying assets； what we pay for a business does not affect the amount of capital its manager has to work with。 （If； to bee a shareholder and part owner of merce Clearing House； you pay； say； six times book value； that does not change CCH's return on equity。）
当然Berkshire真正从这些公司赚得的报酬并没有那么地高，因为当初买下这些公司时，支付了相当的溢价才取得这些股份，经过统计我们在这些公司原始投资超过其帐列的股权净值的溢价金额约为二亿二千二百万美元，当然要判断这些公司经理人的绩效应该是要看他们创造的盈余是靠多少资产所产生的，至于我们用多少钱买下这些公司与经理人的绩效并无关联，就算你用高于净值六倍的价钱买下一家公司，同样也不会影响该公司的股东权益报酬率。
Three important inferences can be drawn from the figures I have cited。 First； the current business value of these seven units is far above their historical book value and also far above the value at which they are carried on Berkshire's balance sheet。 Second； because so little capital is required to run these businesses； they can grow while concurrently making almost all of their earnings available for deployment in new opportunities。 Third； these businesses are run by truly extraordinary managers。 The Blumkins； the Heldmans； Chuck Huggins； Stan Lipsey； and Ralph Schey all meld unusual talent； energy and character to achieve exceptional financial results。
以上所提数字代表着三项重要的指针，首先现在这七家企业的真正价值远高于其帐面净值，同样也远高于Berkshire帐列的投资成本，第二因为经营这些事业并不需要太多的资金，所以这些公司利用所赚取的盈余便足以支应本身业务的发展，第三这些事业都由非常能干的经理人在经营，像是Blumkins家族、Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey与Ralph Schey皆兼具才干、精力与品格，将旗下事业经营的有声有色。
For good reasons； we had very high expectations when we joined with these managers。 In every case； however； our experience has greatly exceeded those expectations。 We have received far more than we deserve； but we are willing to accept such inequities。 （We subscribe to the view Jack Benny expressed upon receiving an acting award： 〃I don't deserve this； but then； I have arthritis and I don't deserve that either。〃）
也因此当初这些明星经理人加入时，我们并抱持着极高的期待，事后证明得到的结果远高于预期，我们获得远高于我们所应得的，当然我们很乐意接受这样不公平的对待，我们借用杰克班尼在获得最佳男主角时的感言：「我不应该得到这个奖项，但同样地我也不应该得到关节炎。」
Beyond the Sainted Seven； we have our other major unit； insurance； which I believe also has a business value well above the net assets employed in it。 However； appraising the business value of a property…casualty insurance pany is a decidedly imprecise process。 The industry is volatile； reported earnings oftentimes are seriously inaccurate； and recent changes in the Tax Code will severely hurt future profitability。 Despite these problems； we like the business and it will almost certainly remain our largest operation。 Under Mike Goldberg's management； the insurance business should treat us well over time。
除了这七个圣徒之外，我们还有一项主要的事业…保险，同样地我也认为它的价值远高于其帐列的资产，只是要评估一家产物意外险公司的价值就没有办法那么明确了，这个产业变动很大，报表所列的获利数字有时会有很大的偏差，而且最近税法修正对我们未来年度的获利有很大的影响，尽管如此保险事业仍会是我们经营事业的最大重心，在Mike Goldberg的管理之下，保险事业的报酬仍可期待。
With managers like ours； my partner； Charlie Munger； and I have little to do with operations。 in fact； it is probably fair to say that if we did more； less would be acplished。 We have no corporate meetings； no corporate budgets； and no performance reviews （though our managers； of course； oftentimes find such procedures useful at their operating units）。 After all； what can we tell the Blumkins about home furnishings； or the Heldmans about uniforms？
有这些优秀的专业经理人，在事业的日常营运上，查理孟格跟我实在是没有什么好费心思的地方，事实上，平心而论我们管的越多，可能只会把事情搞砸，在Berkshire我们没有企业会议，也没有年度预算，更没有绩效考核 （当然各个企业单位因应自身所需，有自己的一套管理办法） ，但总的来说，我们实在没有什么可以告诉指导Blumkin如何去卖家具事业或是指导Heldman家族如何经营制服事业。
Our major contribution to the operations of our subsidiaries is applause。 But it is not the indiscriminate applause of a Pollyanna。 Rather it is informed applause based upon the two long careers we have spent intensively observing business performance and managerial behavior。 Charlie and I have seen so much of the ordinary in business that we can truly appreciate a virtuoso performance。 Only one response to the 1987 performance of our operating managers is appropriate： sustained； deafening applause。
我们对于这些所属事业单位最重要的支持就是适时地给予掌声，但这绝对不是在做烂好人，相反地这是长久下来我们深入观察这些企业的经营结果与管理当局的作为所给予的正面肯定，我们两个人这些年来看过太多平庸企业的表现，所以我们是真正地珍惜他们艺术级的演出，对于1987年旗下子公司整体的表现，我们只能报以热烈的掌声，而且是震耳欲聋的掌声。
Sources of Reported Earnings
盈余的来源
下表显示Berkshire主要盈余的来源，其中商誉的摊销与购买法的会计调整数，特别从各个企业挑出汇总成单独一栏，事实上这样的目的是为了让旗下事业的经营绩效，不因我们买下他们而有所影响，在1983与1986年的年报中，我已不只一次的解释这样的表达方式会比依照一般公认会计原则更符合管理当局与投资者的需要，当然最后加总结算的数字，还是会与会计师出具的财务报表上的盈余数字完全一致。
The table on the following page shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings。 In the table； amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase…price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but； instead； are aggregated and shown separately。 In effect； this procedure presents the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them。 In appendixes to my letters in the 1983 and 1986 annual reports； I explained why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation； which makes purchase…price adjustments on a business…by business basis。 The total net earnings we show in the table are； of course； identical to the GAAP figures in our audited financial statements。 In the Business Segment Data on pages 36…38 and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40…44 you will find much additional information about our businesses。 In these sections you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis。 I urge you to read that material； as well as Charlie Munger's letter to Wesco shareholders； describing the various businesses of that subsidiary； which starts on page 45。
在后面的部门别信息中，大家可以找到个别事业的详细信息，除此之外，我也强烈建议大家一定要看查理写给Wesco股东叙述其旗下事业情况的一封信
1987 Unit：US'000
Earnings Before Ine Tax After Ine Tax
Percent Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
Earnings from Operation
Insurance Group
Underwriting （55；429） （20；696）
Net Investment Ine 152；483 136；658
Buffalio News 39；410 21；304
Fechheimer 13；332 6；580
Kirby 22；408 12；891
Nebraska Furniture Mart 16；837 7；554
Scott Fetzer…Diversified 30；591 17；555
See's Candies 31；693 17；363
Wesco Financial Corporation…Parent 6；209 4；978
World Book 25；745 15；136
Amortization of Goodwill （2；862） （2；862）
Interest on Debt （11；474） （5；905）
Shareholder's Contribution （4；938） （2；963）
Other 16；914 7；152
0 280；919 214；745
Realized Securities Gain 27；319 19；807
Total Earnings…all entities 0 308；238 234；552
Gypsy Rose Lee在她晚年的一场生日宴会上宣布：「我还是拥有去年所有的一切，现在唯一的差别是全部都矮了两吋。」如同本表所示，在1987年几乎我们所有的事业都又成长的一岁。
Gypsy Rose Lee announced on one of her later birthdays： 〃I have everything I had last year； it's just that it's all two inches lower。〃 As the table shows； during 1987 almost all of our businesses aged in a more upbeat way。
我们旗下这些事业实在是没有什么新的变化可以特别提出报告的，所谓没有消息就是好消息，剧烈的变动通常不会有特别好的绩效，当然这与大部分的投资人认为的刚好相反，大家通常将最高的本益比给予那些擅长画大饼的企业，这些美好的远景会让投资人不顾现实经营的情况，而一昧幻想未来可能的获利美梦，对于这种爱做梦的投资人来说，任何路边的野花，都会比邻家的女孩来的具吸引力，不管后者是如何贤慧。
There's not a lot new to report about these businesses … and that's good； not bad。 Severe change and exceptional returns usually don't mix。 Most investors； of course； behave as if just the opposite were true。 That is； they usually confer the highest price…earnings ratios on exotic…sounding businesses that hold out the promise of feverish change。 That prospect lets investors fantasize about future profitability rather than face today's business realities。 For such investor…dreamers； any blind date is preferable to one with the girl next door； no matter how desirable she may be。
经验显示，能够创造盈余新高的企业，现在做生意的方式通常与其五年前甚至十年前没有多大的差异，当然管理当局绝对不能够太过自满，因为企业总有不断的机会可以改善本身的服务、产品线、制造能力等等，且绝对必须要好好把握，不过一家公司若是为了改变而改变，反而可能增加犯错的机会，讲的更深入一点，在一块动荡不安的土地之上，是不太可能建造一座固若金汤的城堡，而具有这样稳定特质的企业却是持续创造高获利的关键。
Experience； however； indicates that the best business returns are usually achieved by panies that are doing something quite similar today to what they were doing five or ten years ago。 That is no argument for managerial placency。 Businesses always have opportunities to improve service； product lines； manufacturing techniques； and the like； and obviously these opportunities should be seized。 But a business that constantly encounters major change also encounters many chances for major error。 Furthermore； economic terrain that is forever shifting violently is ground on which it is difficult to build a fortress…like business franchise。 Such a franchise is usually the key to sustained high returns。
先前提到财星杂志的研究，可以充分支持我的论点，在1977年到1986年间，总计1；000家中只有25家能够达到连续十年平均股东权益报酬率达到20％的标准，且没有一年低于15％的双重标准，而这些优质企业同时也是股票市场上的宠儿，在所有的25家中有24家的表现超越S&P500指数。
The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view。 Only 25 of the 1；000 panies met two tests of economic excellence … an average return on equity of over 20％ in the ten years； 1977 through 1986； and no year worse than 15％。 These business superstars were also stock market superstars： During the decade； 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500。
这些财富之星可能让你大开眼界，首先相对于本身支付利息的能力，他们所运用的财务杠杆极其有限，一家真正好的公司是不需要借钱的，第二除了有一家是所谓的高科技公司，另外少数几家属于制药业以外，大多数的公司产业相当平凡普通，大部分现在销售的产品或服务与十年前大致相同，（虽然数量或是价格、或是两者都有，比以前高很多），这些公司的记录显示，充分运用现有产业地位，或是专注在单一领导的产品品牌之上通常是创造企业暴利的不二法门。
The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects。 First； most use very little leverage pared to their interest…paying capacity。 Really good businesses usually don't need to borrow。 Second； except for one pany that is 〃high…tech〃 and several others that manufacture ethical drugs； the panies are in businesses that； on balance； seem rather mundane。 Most sell non…sexy products or serv