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you to ask any owner…related questions you may have； and we will keep answering until all （except those dealing with portfolio activities or other proprietary information） have been dealt with。
今年的股东会将在1989年4月24日星期一在奥玛哈举行，我们希望大家都能来参加，这个会议提供一个场所让你能够提出任何与股东有关的问题，我们会一直回答到所有股东都满意为止（除了那些想要知道投资组合明牌或是内线消息的人）
After the meeting we will have several buses available to take you to visit Mrs。 B at The Nebraska Furniture Mart and Ike Friedman at Borsheim。 Be prepared for bargains。
会后我们将安排几台巴士载着有兴趣的股东到B太太的家具广场与波仙珠宝店，准备大捡便宜货吧！
Out…of…towners may prefer to arrive early and visit Mrs。 B during the Sunday store hours of noon to five。 （These Sunday hours seem ridiculously short to Mrs。 B； who feels they scarcely allow her time to warm up； she much prefers the days on which the store remains open from 10 a。m。 to 9 p。m。） Borsheims； however； is not open on Sunday。
外地来的股东可以会选择提早一点来，B太太的店星期天会从中午开到下午五点，只有五个小时可能不够B太太暖身，她可能希望还是能够像平日一样从早上10点到晚上9点，另外波仙珠宝星期天并不开门营业。
Ask Mrs。 B the secret of her astonishingly low carpet prices。 She will confide to you … as she does to everyone … how she does it： I can sell so cheap because I work for this dummy who does not know anything about carpet。？
记得问B太太地毯价格为什么会如此便宜的秘密，她一定会向跟所有人一样地偷偷跟你讲她是如何办到的，（我之所以能够卖的这么便宜是因为我的老板对于地毯根本就一无所知！）
一九八九
Our gain in net worth during 1989 was 1。515 billion； or 44。4％。 Over the last 25 years （that is； since present management took over） our per…share book value has grown from 19。46 to 4；296。01； or at a rate of 23。8％ pounded annually。
本公司1989年的净值增加了15亿1千5百万美元，较去年增加了44。4％，过去25年以来（也就是自从现有经营阶层接手后），每股净值从19元成长到现在的4；296美元，年复合成长率约为23。8％。
What counts； however； is intrinsic value … the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth。 With perfect foresight； this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business … in and out … and discounting them at prevailing interest rates。 So valued； all businesses； from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones； bee economic equals。
然而真正重要的还是实质价值…这个数字代表组合我们企业所有份子合理的价值，根据精准的远见，这个数字可由企业未来预计的现金流量（包含流进与流出），并以现行的利率予以折现，不管是马鞭的制造公司或是行动电话的业者都可以在同等的地位上，据以评估其经济价值。
Back when Berkshire's book value was 19。46； intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried。 Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values。 This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has pounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23。8％ annual growth in book value。
当Berkshire的帐面价值是19。46美元之时，由于主要的资产多属于纺织事业，所以实质的价值大概比帐面价值要少一点，但时至今日我们企业的价值却早已较帐面价值多的多，这代表着Berkshire实质价值成长的速度要比帐面价值每年平均23。8％的复合成长率还要再高一些。
The rear…view mirror is one thing； the windshield is another。 A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that； with minor exceptions； are carried on our balance sheet at current market values。 At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices； relative to their own intrinsic business values； than has been the case in the past。 One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market。 More important； the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized。 Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low； they are not now。
后照镜是一回事，雨刷又是另外一回事，我们帐面价值大部分是反应我们所持有的有价证券，而这些有价证券除了少数的例外，又大多以市价在资产负债表上列示，在去年年底这些有价证券较之过去，又以比实质价值呈现更高的价格，一方面当然是因为1989年股市的飙涨，另一方面则是这些有价证券的价值得到大家的认同，也就是说过去他们的股价曾经相当的低，但这种情况如今已不复存在。
We will keep most of our major holdings； regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value。 This 's untill…death…do…us…part attitude； bined with the full prices these holdings mand； means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past。 In other words； our performance to date has benefited from a double…dip： （1） the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio panies have achieved； （2） the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately 〃corrected〃 the prices of these panies； raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business。 We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio panies will make。 But our 〃catch…up〃 rewards have been realized； which means we'll have to settle for a single…dip in the future。
我们仍然会保有我们主要的持股，不管相较于实质价值，他们现在的市场价格是多少，我们对于他们至死不分离的态度加上这些股份现在的价位，意味者他们在未来可能无法再像先前那样将Berkshire的净值大幅向上推升，换句话说，我们能有现在的表现主要受惠于两方面（1）我们旗下的公司所创造出的实质价值增长 （2）由于市场对于这些公司的股价，相较于一般企业所做合理的修正所带来的额外红利。在未来我们有信心仍然可以享受公司所创造出来的价值，但是对于先前补涨的利益则因为大都已实现，这意味着我们将来只能靠前者来受惠。
We face another obstacle： In a finite world； high growth rates must self…destruct。 If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny； this law may not operate for a time。 But when the base balloons； the party ends： A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor。
此外我们还面临到另一项挑战，在有限的世界里，任何高成长的事物终将自我毁灭，若是成长的基础相对较小，则这项定律偶尔会被暂时打破，但是当基础膨胀到一定程度时，好戏就会结束，高成长终有一天会被自己所束缚。
Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon； musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes。 Says Sagan： 〃That means four doublings an hour； and 96 doublings a day。 Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram； its descendants； after a day of wild asexual abandon； will collectively weigh as much as a mountain。。。in two days； more than the sun … and before very long； everything in the universe will be made of bacteria。〃 Not to worry； says Sagan： Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth。 〃The bugs run out of food； or they poison each other； or they are shy about reproducing in public。〃
Carl Sagan曾经开玩笑地解释这种现象，假设有一种细菌每15分钟可以分裂一次，亦即代表每一小时复制四次，一天可复制96次，虽然单一个细菌其重量只有一兆分之一公克重，但是只要经过一天无止尽的无性生殖，其重量可能会比一座山还重，经过两天后，甚至会比太阳还重，要不了多久所有的宇宙都将由这种细菌所组成，不过Sagan又说，大家不必担心，上天一定会安排障碍来阻止其倍数成长，有可能他会耗尽食物，或是毒死自己，或是有可能羞于在大庭广众之下复制。
Even on bad days； Charlie Munger （Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner） and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium。 Nor； to our unending sorrow； have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes。 Furthermore； we are not the least bit shy about reproducing … financially … in public。 Nevertheless； Sagan's observations apply。 From Berkshire's present base of 4。9 billion in net worth； we will find it much more difficult to average 15％ annual growth in book value than we did to average 23。8％ from the 22 million we began with。
即使是在最坏的情况下，查理孟格（Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人），与我都不认为Berkshire会像细菌一样无止尽地成长，当然更不可能像细菌那样找到每15分钟就能够复制一次的方法，虽然我们不会像细菌那般羞于在公开场合进行复制，不过Sagan的观察还是对的，相较于刚开始的2；200万，以Berkshire目前的49亿美元的净值基础，我们实在很难像过去那样每年以15％以上的成长率增加。
Taxes
租税
Our 1989 gain of 1。5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about 712 million for ine taxes。 In addition； Berkshire's share of the ine taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about 175 million。
事实上，1989年Berkshire 15亿美元的增加净值还是已扣除7。12亿美元估计应付所得税后的净额，此外这还不包含其五个主要被投资公司合计已缴1。75亿美元的所得税。
Of this year's tax charge； about 172 million will be paid currently； the remainder； 540 million； is deferred。 Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our mon stock holdings。 Against this increase； we have reserved a 34％ tax。
在今年的所得税费用中，大约有1。72亿美元是马上要支付的，剩下的5。4亿则可以记帐递延处理，大部分是由于1989年我们持有的股票未实现利益，以34％的预估税率计算出来的数字。
We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988。 But； as we explained last year； the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 … about 1。2 billion … carry reserves booked at the 28％ tax rate that then prevailed。
另外我们也1987年及1988年的未实现资本利得依照前项税率补提准备，但如同去年解释过的，我们在1987年所累积的未实现利益约12亿美元仍依照当时28％的税率提列准备。
A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require panies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate； whatever it may be。 With the rate at 34％； such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability； and decrease our net worth； by about 71 million … the result of raising the reserve on our pre…1987 gain by six percentage points。 Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear； we have not yet made this change。
新的会计原则有可能会要求公司将所有的利得以现行的税率估算（不管实际可能会是多少），若以34％来计（等于将税率提高6个百分点），这样的规则可能会大幅增加我们帐列递延所得税的数字，并使我们的帐面净值减少约7；100万美元，由于新提出的规定引发相当大的争议，最后的结果尚难定论，所以目前公司帐上尚未做此反应。
As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27； we would owe taxes of more than 1。1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year…end market values。 Is this 1。1 billion liability equal； or even similar； to a 1。1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year？ Obviously not … despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth； reducing it by 1。1 billion。
大家可以从资产负债表上看到，若是年底我们一口气将所有的有价证券按市价全部出清，则我们要支付的所得税将高达11亿美元，但这11亿的负债真的就跟15天后要付给厂商的货款，一样或是相近吗？ 很显然的并非如此，虽然在财务报表上计算的净值的方式都一样，只是很简单地减掉11亿美元。
On the other hand； is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that； in very large part； we have no intention of selling？ Again； the answer is no。
从另一个角度来看，难道这项估计所得税负债，会因为我们从来没有意愿要把股票卖掉，所以政府课不到所得税，就表示它不具重大的意义吗？ 答案很显然也不是。
In economic terms； the liability resembles an interest…free loan from the U。S。 Treasury that es due only at our election （unless； of course； Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized）。 This 〃loan〃 is peculiar in other respects as well： It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular； appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size … daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change。 In effect； this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another。 Indeed； we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989； incurring about 76 million of 〃transfer〃 tax on 224 million of gains。
就经济实质而言，这种所得税负债就好象是美国国库借给我们的无息贷款，且到期日由我们自己来决定，（当然除非国会把课税时点提早到未实现时），这种贷款还有一项很奇怪的特点，它只能被用来购买某些特定涨价的股票，而且额度会随时市场价格来变动，有时也会因为税率变动而改变，事实上这种递延所得税其实有点类似于资产移转时所要缴交的交易税，事实上我们在1989年只做了一小部份的变动，总共产生了2。24亿的资本利得，因此发生了7；600万的交易税。
Because of the way the tax law works； the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor … if successf