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The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion。 At that time； the bined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons； both related to lags。 First； data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new 〃corrected〃 rates； which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers。 Second； the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one…to three…year term … which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire … delayed the impact of new rates on revenues。 These two lagged responses made bined ratios behave much like alternating current。 Meanwhile； the absence of significant price petition guaranteed that industry profits； averaged out over the cycle； would be satisfactory。
这个名词在几十年前当产业界与政府单位通力合作维持一个类似卡特尔组织时或许还适用，在那个年代，综合比率只因两个原因上下变动，两者都具有递延性，第一是过去的信息会被分析然而据以订定新的费率，一体适用于所有的保险业者之上；第二所有的保单通常是一次以三年为期，这代表着一张有问题的保单通常要花三年才能解决，所以新费率的实施影响有其递延性，这两个因素使得综合比率的变化有脉络可循，同时没有价格的竞争通常就保证可以有稳定的获利，意味着整个循环下来可以获致满意的报酬。
The cartel period is long gone。 Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a modity…like product at independently…established prices。 Such a configuration … whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies … is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one： a shortage of usable capacity。 Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question。
不过卡特尔的年代早已过去，现在的产业有几百家公司在销售同一种商品，价格各自独立，在这种情况下，不管所卖的商品是钢铁或是保单，除了产能短缺的情况之外，整体同业的获利一定很可怜，不过却须视所处产业的获利情况来决定短缺情况的发生时点与期间长短。
In most industries； capacity is described in physical terms。 In the insurance world； however； capacity is customarily described in financial terms； that is； it's considered appropriate for a pany to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth。 In practice； however； constraints of this sort have proven ineffective。 Regulators； insurance brokers； and customers are all slow to discipline panies that strain their resources。 They also acquiesce when panies grossly overstate their true capital。 Hence； a pany can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined。 At bottom； therefore； the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers。
在大部分的产业，产能是以具体的事物来呈现，不过在保险的世界里，产能所代表的却是指财务数字，亦即假设一家公司的净值有Y，那么他可以承接的保单大概就只能有X，就实务而言，做这样的限制其实效果相当有限，主管机关、保险掮客与客户对于其节制背后的保险公司的反应都很慢，而且就算真正的资本有被夸大的情况，他们也给予姑息，因此一家资本额不大的保险公司若他们愿意，照样可以接下一大堆保单，因此整个保险业的供给能量，主要还是视保险公司经理人本身的心态而定。
All this understood； it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits。 Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity。 Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened。 That happens rarely … and most assuredly is not happening now。
在了解内情之后，大家不难预知这个产业未来的获利情况，获利要好只有当供给短缺时才有可能发生，而供给短缺只有当保险业者感到害怕时才有可能发生，而偏偏这种情况又很少见，且可以确定短期之内不会出现。
Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes … Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake … will cause prices to strengthen significantly。 We disagree。 These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices。 Therefore； premium volume won't grow by 10％ in 1990； which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse。
有些分析师认为最近刚实施的保险业新税法过于繁重，同时加上Hugo飓风与加州的地震，将会是保险费率大幅提高，我们并不认同这样的看法，因为这些负面的因素并不会迫使同业不以现在的价格接受保单，因此1990年的保费收入应该无法成长10％以上，也就是说整体的承保绩效可能还会继续恶化。
The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business。 Of course it does。 So does the steel business。 But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long…term profitability of industries。 Instead； economic fundamentals determine the oute。 Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices。 And we're a long way from that point。
业者同时也会宣称保险业需要调高价格才能维持一般美国企业的获利水平，当然事实确是如此，钢铁业也一样，但需要与想要与产业长期的获利并无绝对相关，反而是经济实质现况才是决定结果的关键因素，保险业的获利要改进，只有靠所有业者通力合作，除非价格合理否则就不接生意，但现在离那样的情况还很远。
Berkshire's premium volume may drop to 150 million or so in 1990 （from a high of 1 billion in 1986）； partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7％ of the business of Fireman's Fund expired last August。 Whatever the size of the drop； it will not disturb us。 We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss； we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit。
Berkshire 1990年的保费收入可能会降至1。5亿美元左右，（相较于1986年的10亿美元高点），一方面是因为我们传统的业务持续在萎缩，一方面是消防人员退休基金这项业务在去年八月已到期，但不管业务量减少多少，一点都不影响我们，我们完全没有兴趣去接那种一看就会赔钱的保单，光是那些看起来有赚头的生意就够我们受的了。
However； our appetite for appropriately…priced business is ample； as one tale from 1989 will tell。 It concerns 〃CAT covers；〃 which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance panies （and also reinsurers themselves） buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe； such as a tornado or hurricane； that produces losses from a large number of policies。 In these contracts； the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of； say； 10 million； buying various layers of reinsurance above that level。 When losses exceed the retained amount； the reinsurer typically pays 95％ of the excess up to its contractual limit； with the primary insurer paying the remainder。 （By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5％ of each layer； the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money。）
然而我们对于价格合理的生意胃口却很足够，1989年有一件事可以说明，那就是CAT防护，也就是一般保险公司（也包含再保公司本身）都会向再保公司签约买下再保合约，来免于承担像是龙卷风或是飓风等单一意外事件所可能引发钜额损失的风险，在这些再保合约中，原始的保险公司可能会保留一个单一的损失上限，例如1；000万美金，然后在此之上买进好几层的再保险，当损失超过自留的部份时，再保公司依规定就要支付超过的部份，最高比例可达95％，（之所以要求保险公司本身每层保留5％，是为了让保险公司与再保公司站在同一阵线，避免保险公司慷再保公司之凯）。
CAT covers are usually one…year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement； which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium。 This provision protects the primary pany from being 〃bare〃 for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event。 The duration of 〃an event〃 is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary pany。 Under this definition； a wide…spread storm； causing damage for three days； will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause。 If the storm lasts four days； however； the primary pany will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage。 Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event。
CAT防护的保单通常是一年期，一般可以自动延长一年，这样的条款主要是保护保险公司避免因为重大灾害发生后，投保的空窗期，事件发生的持续期间通常由合约限定在72小时以内，在这种定义之下，一场持续三天的大风暴所造成的损害，可被归类为单一事件。要是大风暴持续四天以上，则保险公司可以切割出其受害最惨重的72小时，超过的部份则必须视为另一个独立的事件。
In 1989； two unusual things happened。 First； Hurricane Hugo generated 4 billion or more of insured loss； at a pace； however； that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean。 Second； the California earthquake hit within weeks； causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate； even well after the event。 Slammed by these two … or possibly three … major catastrophes； some primary insurers； and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection； either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so。
1989年有两件特殊的事件发生，第一Hugo飓风造成40亿美元的损失，不过之后不久72小时，又在加勒比海发生相同规模的灾害；第二加州大地震在几个礼拜内又接连发生，造成难以估计的损失，受到这两个事件严重的打击，或者应该说是三个，许多有买CAT防身的保险公司及再保公司，立刻使用第二次投保权。
At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money … perhaps twice because of the reinstatements … and not taken in much in premiums。 Depending upon many variables； a CAT premium might generally have run 3％ to 15％ of the amount of protection purchased。 For some years； we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business。
在当时许多卖CAT保单的业者亏了一屁股，尤其是第二次投保部份，根本收不到足够的保费，由于有许多变量，保费通常会是在保额的3％到15％不等，有好几年，我们认为这种保费收入并不合理，所以没有介入这个市场。
But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare； and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds； there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much…needed catastrophe coverage。 Prices instantly became attractive； particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy。 Just as instantly； Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to 250 million of catastrophe coverage； advertising that proposition in trade publications。 Though we did not write all the business we sought； we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount。
但是1989年的大灾害使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是再保公司本身自己所买的保单，若有需要，Berkshire可以马上就签下2。5亿美元以上的保单，虽然并不是所有上门的生意都接，但忙个十天下来所签的保单金额也是相当可观。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world。 There are； of course； panies that sometimes write 250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage。 But they do so only when they can； in turn； reinsure a large percentage of the business with other panies。 When they can't 〃lay off〃 in size； they disappear from the market。
世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下二亿五美金的灾害理赔保险，但是其提通常是他们可以再向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他们会马上退出市场。
Berkshire's policy； conversely； is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off。 When rates carry an expectation of profit； we want to assume as much risk as is prudent。 And in our case； that's a lot。
相反地Berkshire的政策则是保留大部分的保额而不是把他们给分配掉，当保险费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该是个大数字。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other pany because of two factors： （1） by the standards of regulatory accounting； we have a net worth in our insurance panies of about 6 billion … the second highest amount in the United States； and （2） we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly； or even annually； just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings （or losses） were reached intelligently。
我们之所