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mbers of your family； own ___I believe we would do very well financially； and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you have had during the past 20。我不会刻意纠缠你，但若你有任何的意愿想要出售的话，我会很乐意接到你的电话，我很荣幸能够让Berkshire与你的家族成员一起拥有这份事业；我相信公司在财务上一定会变得更好，而我也相信在未来的20年内，你也会像过去20年来一样，愉快地继续经营这份事业。
一九九一
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was 2。1 billion； or 39。6％。 Over the last 27 years （that is； since present management took over） our per…share book value has grown from 19 to 6；437； or at a rate of 23。7％ pounded annually。
1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元，较去年增加了39。6％，而总计过去27年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值从19元成长到现在的6；437美元，年复合成长率约为23。7％。
The size of our equity capital … which now totals 7。4 billion … makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or； for that matter； e close to doing so。 As Berkshire grows； the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the pany's performance constantly shrinks。 When we were working with capital of 20 million； an idea or business producing 1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year。 Now we need a 370 million idea （i。e。； one contributing over 550 million of pre…tax profit） to achieve the same result。 And there are many more ways to make 1 million than to make 370 million。
现在我们股东权益的资金规模已高达74亿美元，所以可以确定的是，我们可能再也无法像过去那样继续维持高成长，而随着Berkshire不断地成长，世上所存可以大幅影响本公司表现的机会也就越来越少。当我们操作的资金只有2；000万美元的时候，一项获利100万美元的案子就可以使得我们的年报酬率增加5％，但时至今日，我们却要有3。7亿美元的获利（要是以税前计算的话，更要5。5亿美元），才能达到相同的效果，而要一口气赚3。7亿美元比起一次赚100万美元的难度可是高的多了。
Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman； and I have set a goal of attaining a 15％ average annual increase in Berkshire's intrinsic value。 If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15％ pace； we must earn 22 billion during the next decade。 Wish us luck … we'll need it。
查理孟格…Berkshire的副主席与我一起设定，以15％做为每年公司实质价值成长的目标，也就是说如果在未来十年内，公司要能达到这个目标，则帐面净值至少要增加22亿美元，请大家祝我们好运吧！ 我们真的很需要祝福。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated： a dramatic rise in the price…earnings ratios of Coca…Cola and Gillette。 These two stocks accounted for nearly 1。6 billion of our 2。1 billion growth in net worth last year。 When we loaded up on Coke three years ago； Berkshire's net worth was 3。4 billion； now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that。
我们在1991年所经历帐面数字的超额成长是一种不太可能再发生的现象，受惠于可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀本益比的大幅飙升，光是这两家公司就合计贡献了我们去年21亿美元净值成长中的16亿美元，三年前当我们大笔敲进可口可乐股票的时候，Berkshire的净值大约是34亿美元，但是现在光是我们持有可口可乐的股票市值就超过这个数字。
Coca…Cola and Gillette are two of the best panies in the world and we expect their earnings to grow at hefty rates in the years ahead。 Over time； also； the value of our holdings in these stocks should grow in rough proportion。 Last year； however； the valuations of these two panies rose far faster than their earnings。 In effect； we got a double…dip benefit； delivered partly by the excellent earnings growth and even more so by the market's reappraisal of these stocks。 We believe this reappraisal was warranted。 But it can't recur annually： We'll have to settle for a single dip in the future。
可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀可说是当今世上最好的两家公司，我们预期在未来几年他们的获利还会以惊人的速度成长，相对地我们持股的价值也会以等比例的程度增加，然而另一方面去年这两家公司的股价上涨的幅度却远高于其本身获利增长的幅度，所以说去年我们是两面得利，一方面是靠公司绝佳的获利能力，一方面是市场对于公司股票的重新评价，当然我们认为这样的调整是经得起考验的，但这种情况不太可能每年都发生，展望未来我们可能只能靠前面那点而获益。
A Second Job第二件工作
In 1989 when I … a happy consumer of five cans of Cherry Coke daily … announced our purchase of 1 billion worth of Coca…Cola stock； I described the move as a rather extreme example of putting our money where my mouth was。 On August 18 of last year； when I was elected Interim Chairman of Salomon Inc； it was a different story： I put my mouth where our money was。
1989年当我以每天五瓶樱桃可乐的爱用者身分，宣布买进价值10亿美元的可口可乐股票时，我曾形容这项举动其实只是将钱花在嘴巴上的最佳例证，在去年8月18日当我被推举为所罗门公司的临时主席时，则完全是另外一件事，这次我把嘴巴摆在我们的钱上。
You've all read of the events that led to my appointment。 My decision to take the job carried with it an implicit but important message： Berkshire's operating managers are so outstanding that I knew I could materially reduce the time I was spending at the pany and yet remain confident that its economic progress would not skip a beat。 The Blumkins； the Friedman family； Mike Goldberg； the Heldmans； Chuck Huggins； Stan Lipsey； Ralph Schey and Frank Rooney （CEO of H。H。 Brown； our latest acquisition； which I will describe later） are all masters of their operations and need no help from me。 My job is merely to treat them right and to allocate the capital they generate。 Neither function is impeded by my work at Salomon。
我想大家应该都已经从报上看过有关我个人任命为所罗门董事会临时主席的报导，我之所以愿意接受这个职位具有一个深刻且重要的意义，那就是Berkshire旗下事业的经理人是如此的优秀，让我可能很放心的时间摆在别的心思之上，而完全不必担心公司的营运会走样，Blumkins家族、Friedman 家族、Mike Goldberg、the Heldmans、Chuck Huggins、Stan Lipsey 、Ralph Schey与Frank Rooney（我们最新购并的HH Brown鞋业的CEO，后面还会有详细的介绍）等人，都是所属产业的龙头，因此根本就不需要我个人的协助，我的工作只是要思考如何更公平合理地对待他们，同时有效地运用他们所产生出来的资金，而这两方面都不会因为我在所罗门的工作而受到影响。
The role that Charlie and I play in the success of our operating units can be illustrated by a story about George Mira； the one…time quarterback of the University of Miami； and his coach； Andy Gustafson。 Playing Florida and near its goal line； Mira dropped back to pass。 He spotted an open receiver but found his right shoulder in the unshakable grasp of a Florida linebacker。 The right…handed Mira thereupon switched the ball to his other hand and threw the only left…handed pass of his life … for a touchdown。 As the crowd erupted； Gustafson calmly turned to a reporter and declared： 〃Now that's what I call coaching。〃
查理跟我在这些成功的企业所扮演的角色，可以由迈阿密大学著名的四分卫…George Mira与他的教练…Andy Gustafson的故事来作说明，有一回在与佛罗里达大学对抗时，在终点线前，Mira突然煞车后退并准备传球，他看到有一个队友有空档，不过他的右手边却有一位难以摆脱的防守球员在侧，右撇子的Mira于是将球换到左手，并丢出生平第一次的左手传球，而后达阵成功，当所有的球迷疯狂地簇拥而上，教练Gustafson镇定地转向一位记者说到：「这都是因为我平常训练有素的缘故！」。
Given the managerial stars we have at our operating units； Berkshire's performance is not affected if Charlie or I slip away from time to time。 You should note； however； the 〃interim〃 in my Salomon title。 Berkshire is my first love and one that will never fade： At the Harvard Business School last year； a student asked me when I planned to retire and I replied； 〃About five to ten years after I die。〃
以我们现有的梦幻明星级的经营团队阵容来说，Berkshire的表现绝不会因为查理或是我偶尔跷班而有所影响，大家必须知道，我在所罗门的名衔只是暂时的， Berkshire才是我的最爱，而且是至死不渝的爱，去年在哈佛商学院，有学生问我何时会退休，我的回答是：「大概要等到我死后五到十年吧！」。
Sources of Reported Earnings帐列盈余的来源
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings。 In this presentation； amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase…price accounting adjustments are notcharged against the specific businesses to which they apply； but are instead aggregated and shown separately。 This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them。 I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles （GAAP）； which require purchase…price adjustments to be made on a business…by…business basis。 The total net earnings we show in the table are； of course； identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements。
下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是
对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
A large amount of additional information about these businesses is given on pages 33…47； where you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis。 However； we will not in this letter discuss each of our non…insurance operations； as we have in the past。 Our businesses have grown in number … and will continue to grow … so it now makes sense to rotate coverage； discussing one or two in detail each year。
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，依照一般公认会计原则所编写的格式，另外从今年开始我们将不再像过去那样详细叙述非保险业的营运，因为我们旗下事业组织日益庞大，且以后还会继续成长，所以实在是没有必要每年都重复讨论相同的事情。
（000s omitted） Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings （after taxes and Pre…Tax Earnings minority interests）
1991 1990 1991 1990
Operating Earnings： Insurance Group：
Underwriting Net Investment Ine H。 H。 Brown （acquired 7/1/91） Buffalo News Fechheimer Kirby 。
1991 （119；593） 331；846 13；616 37；113 12；947 35；726
1990 （26；647） 327；047 … 43；954 12；450 27；445
1991 （77；229） 285；173 8；611 21；841 6；843 22；555
1990 （14；936） 282；613 … 25；981 6；605 17；613
Nebraska Furniture Mart Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group See's Candies Wesco … other than Insurance World Book Amortization of Goodwill
1991 14；384 26；123 42；390 12；230 22；483 （4；113）
1990 17；248 30；378 39；580 12；441 31；896 （3；476）
1991 6；993 15；901 25；575 8；777 15；487 （4；098）
1990 8；485 18；458 23；892 9；676 20；420 （3；461）
Other Purchase…Price
Shareholder…Designated
Accounting Charges Interest Expense* Contributions Other
1991 （6；021） （89；250） （6；772） 77；399
1990 （5；951） （76；374） （5；824） 58；310
1991 （7；019） （57；165） （4；388） 47；896
1990 （6；856） （49；726） （3；801） 35；782
Operating Earnings Sales of Securities Total Earnings … All Entities
1991 400；508 192；478 592；986
1990 482；477 33；989 516；466
1991 315；753 124；155 439；908
1990 370；745 23；348 394；093
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and
Mutual Savings & Loan。
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用
〃Look…Through〃 Earnings透视盈余
We've previously discussed look…through earnings； which consist of： （1） the operating earnings reported in the previous section； plus； （2） the retained operating earnings of major investees that； under GAAP accounting； are not reflected in our profits； less； （3） an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us。
之前我们曾经讨论过透视盈余，其主要的组成份子有（1）前段所提到的帐列盈余，加上（2）主要被投资公司的保留盈余，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的盈余，扣除（3）若这些未反应的盈余分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。
I've told you that over time look…through earnings must increase at about 15％ annually if our intrinsic business value is to grow at that rate。 Indeed； since present management took over in 1965； our look…through earnings have grown at almost the identical 23％ rate of gain recorded for book value。
我曾经告诉各位，长期而言，如果我们的实质价值也期望以这个幅度来成长的话，透视盈余每年也必须增加15％，而的确过自从现有经营阶层于1965年接手后，公司的透视盈余几乎与帐面价值一样，以23％的年复合成长率增加。
Last year； however； our look…through earnings did not grow at all but rather declined by 14％。 To an extent； the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned