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现金就是现金，不管今天它是靠经营媒体事业或是钢铁工厂得来的都一样，而过去同样是一元的获利，大家之所以看重媒体事业的原因是预期他会继续成长（股东不需要再投入额外的资金），而钢铁业很明显会落入打摆子的那类族群，不过现在大家对于媒体事业的看法也逐渐改为后者，而如我们刚刚所举简单的例子，评价的结果可能因为这样的修正而有很大的改变。
We have a significant investment in media … both through our direct ownership of Buffalo News and our shareholdings in The Washington Post pany and Capital Cities/ABC … and the intrinsic value of this investment has declined materially because of the secular transformation that the industry is experiencing。 （Cyclical factors have also hurt our current look…through earnings； but these factors do not reduce intrinsic value。） However； as our Business Principles on page 2…3 note； one of the rules by which we run Berkshire is that we do not sell businesses … or investee holdings that we have classified as permanent … simply because we see ways to use the money more advantageously elsewhere。 （We did sell certain other media holdings sometime back； but these were relatively small。）
我们在媒体事业有相当大的投资，不管是百分之百拥有的水牛城日报或是在华盛顿邮报与资本城/ABC的股票投资，而这些媒体事业的价值因为前面所提到的产业所面临的形态转变而大幅滑落，（景气循环因素也使得我们现在的透视盈余大受影响，虽然还不致于让实质价值减少），然而就像是我们经营Berkshire的企业原则所揭示的，我们不会只是因为还有其它更有利的资金用途，就随便将已被列为永恒的事业或主要投资出售，（当然之前我们也确实卖了一些媒体股，不过规模相对较小）。
The intrinsic value losses that we have suffered have been moderated because the Buffalo News； under Stan Lipsey's leadership； has done far better than most newspapers and because both Cap Cities and Washington Post are exceptionally well…managed。 In particular； these panies stayed on the sidelines during the late 1980's period in which purchasers of media properties regularly paid irrational prices。 Also； the debt of both Cap Cities and Washington Post is small and roughly offset by cash that they hold。 As a result； the shrinkage in the value of their assets has not been accentuated by the effects of leverage。 Among publicly…owned media panies； our two investees are about the only ones essentially free of debt。 Most of the other panies； through a bination of the aggressive acquisition policies they pursued and shrinking earnings； find themselves with debt equal to five or more times their current net ine。
还好我们的实质价值受到损害的情况尚称轻微，因为水牛城日报在Stan Lipsey的领导之下，表现远比其它报纸同业要来的优秀，另一方面资本城与华盛顿邮报的经营也都很上轨道，特别是在1980年代许多媒体公司以高价大举并购同业时，我们的投资事业都只是做壁上观，而资本城与华盛顿邮报两家公司的负债也都很少，甚至于手上的现金就足以清偿所有的债务，因此公司资产的缩水并没有因为杠杆而扩大，所以现在在所有主要的媒体事业当中，大概就只有我们投资的这两家公司可以免于债务所苦，而早期那些透过大量购并的同业，除了盈余大幅缩水之外，还同时背负着至少相当于年度获利能力五倍以上的负债。
The strong balance sheets and strong managements of Cap Cities and Washington Post leave us more fortable with these investments than we would be with holdings in any other media panies。 Moreover； most media properties continue to have far better economic characteristics than those possessed by the average American business。 But gone are the days of bullet…proof franchises and cornucopian economics。
总而言之，资本城及华盛顿邮报超强的资产负债表与管理阶层，持有它们的股份使得我们比持有别家公司的股份感到更放心，而且就现阶段而言，媒体事业还是比其它一般美国企业要来的有竞争力，只是不再像过去拥有金刚不坏之身与诱人的暴利而已。
Twenty Years in a Candy Store二十年的糖果店
We've just passed a milestone： Twenty years ago； on January 3； 1972； Blue Chip Stamps （then an affiliate of Berkshire and later merged into it） bought control of See's Candy Shops； a West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed…chocolates。 The nominal price that the sellers were asking … calculated on the 100％ ownership we ultimately attained … was 40 million。 But the pany had 10 million of excess cash； and therefore the true offering price was 30 million。 Charlie and I； not yet fully appreciative of the value of an economic franchise； looked at the pany's mere 7 million of tangible net worth and said 25 million was as high as we would go （and we meant it）。 Fortunately； the sellers accepted our offer。
我们刚刚跨过历史性的一页，二十年前也就是1972年1月3日，蓝筹邮票公司（原为Berkshire的分支机构，后来并入Berkshire），买下喜斯糖果…西岸的一家盒装巧克力制造与销售厂商，当时卖方所提的报价，以最后取得的100％股权换算约为4；000万美元，但当时光是公司帐上就有1；000万美元的现金，所以认真算起来真正出的资金只有3；000万美金，不过当时查理跟我还不是那么了解一家特许事业所拥有的真正价值，所以在看过帐面净值只有700万美元的报表之后，竟向对方表示2；500万是我们可以出的最高上限（当时我们确实是这样子认为），很幸运的是卖方接受了我们的报价。
The sales of trading stamps by Blue Chip thereafter declined from 102。5 million in 1972 to 1。2 million in 1991。 But See's candy sales in the same period increased from 29 million to 196 million。 Moreover； profits at See's grew even faster than sales； from 4。2 million pre…tax in 1972 to 42。4 million last year。
之后蓝筹邮票公司的邮票买卖收入从1972年的1亿美元下滑到1991年的1；200万美元，但在同一期间喜斯糖果的营收，却从2；900万成长到1。96亿美元，更甚者，其获利成长的幅度还远高于营收成长的幅度，税前获利从1972年的420万，变成去年的4；240万美元。
For an increase in profits to be evaluated properly； it must be pared with the incremental capital investment required to produce it。 On this score； See's has been astounding： The pany now operates fortably with only 25 million of net worth； which means that our beginning base of 7 million has had to be supplemented by only 18 million of reinvested earnings。 Meanwhile； See's remaining pre…tax profits of 410 million were distributed to Blue Chip/Berkshire during the 20 years for these panies to deploy （after payment of taxes） in whatever way made most sense。
对于每多赚一块钱的效益评量，大家必须将其所需额外投入的资金考量进去，就这点儿言，喜斯的表现实在是相当惊人，这家公司现在的净值只有2；500万美元，意思是说除了原来投资时的700万美元，后来只保留了1；800万的盈余未分配，除了之外喜斯将这20年来剩下所赚的4亿1；000万美元，在扣除所得税之后，全部发还给蓝筹邮票与Berkshire，将资金分配到更有利的地方之上。
In our See's purchase； Charlie and I had one important insight： We saw that the business had untapped pricing power。 Otherwise； we were lucky twice over。 First； the transaction was not derailed by our dumb insistence on a 25 million price。 Second； we found Chuck Huggins； then See's executive vice…president； whom we instantly put in charge。 Both our business and personal experiences with Chuck have been outstanding。 One example： When the purchase was made； we shook hands with Chuck on a pensation arrangement … conceived in about five minutes and never reduced to a written contract … that remains unchanged to this day。
在买下喜斯时，有一点是我们已预见的，那就是它尚未被发掘的订价能力，另外我们有两方面算是很幸运，第一整个交易还好没有因为我们愚昧地坚持2；500万美元的上限而告吹，第二我们选中Chuck Huggins…当时喜斯糖果的副总经理，立即走马上任，不管是在公事或是私人方面，我们与Chuck共处的经验都相当难得，有一个例子可以说明，当购并案完成后，我们在短短五分钟内就与Chuck协议好他担任总经理的薪资报酬，而且连书面契约都没有签，就一直延续到今天。
In 1991； See's sales volume； measured in dollars； matched that of 1990。 In pounds； however； volume was down 4％。 All of that slippage took place in the last two months of the year； a period that normally produces more than 80％ of annual profits。 Despite the weakness in sales； profits last year grew 7％； and our pre…tax profit margin was a record 21。6％。
1991年喜斯糖果的销售金额与前一年度相当，但是若是以销售数量来算，则减少了4％，所有减少的部份大多来自于占年度获利80％的最后两个月，不过尽管业绩不太好，获利还是成长了7％，税前盈益率更创下21。6％的新高记录。
Almost 80％ of See's sales e from California and our business clearly was hurt by the recession； which hit the state with particular force late in the year。 Another negative； however； was the mid…year initiation in California of a sales tax of 7％…8？ （depending on the county involved） on 〃snack food〃 that was deemed applicable to our candy。
喜斯糖果80％的收入都来自于加州，而我们的生意很明显地受到景气衰退的影响，尤其在年度的后半段更是显著，另外一个负面因素是加州在年度中开始对零食课征7％…8％的营业税（依每个市镇有所不同），当然巧克力糖果也不能幸免。
Shareholders who are students of epistemological shadings will enjoy California's classifications of 〃snack〃 and 〃non…snack〃 foods：
若是精研认识论差异的股东应该会觉得加州对于零食与非零食的分类感到相当有兴趣。
Taxable 〃Snack〃 Foods Non…Taxable 〃Non…Snack〃 Foods、Ritz Crackers Soda Crackers、Popped Popcorn Unpopped Popcorn、Granola Bars Granola Cereal、Slice of Pie （Wrapped） Whole Pie、Milky Way Candy Bar 、Milky Way Ice Cream BarWhat … you are sure to ask … is the tax status of a melted Milky Way ice cream bar？ In that androgynous form； does it more resemble an ice cream bar or a candy bar that has been left in the sun？ It's no wonder that Brad Sherman； Chairman of California's State Board of Equalization； who opposed the snack food bill but must now administer it； has said： 〃I came to this job as a specialist in tax law。 Now I find my constituents should have elected Julia Child。〃
你一定会问，那融化的牛奶冰淇淋棒要不要课税呢？ 在这种仿真两可的状态下，它到底是比较像冰淇淋棒还是在大太阳底下的糖果棒呢？ 也难怪Brad Sherman…加州公平交易委员会的主席，虽然反对这项法案但还是必须负责监督执行，他提到我以税务专家的身分到这个委员会任职，但我觉得大家要选的对象，应该是小孩子才对。
Charlie and I have many reasons to be thankful for our association with Chuck and See's。 The obvious ones are that we've earned exceptional returns and had a good time in the process。 Equally important； ownership of See's has taught us much about the evaluation of franchises。 We've made significant money in certain mon stocks because of the lessons we learned at See's。
查理跟我有太多理由要感谢Chuck跟喜斯糖果，最明显的原因是他们帮我们赚了那么多钱，而且其间的过程是如此令人愉快，还有一点同样重要的是拥有喜斯糖果让我们对于强势的特许事业有更深一层的认识，我们靠着在喜斯身上所学的东西，在别的股票投资上，又赚了更多的钱。
H。 H。 Brown布朗鞋业
We made a sizable acquisition in 1991 … the H。 H。 Brown pany … and behind this business is an interesting history。 In 1927 a 29…year…old businessman named Ray Heffernan purchased the pany； then located in North Brookfield； Massachusetts； for 10；000 and began a 62…year career of running it。 （He also found time for other pursuits： At age 90 he was still joining new golf clubs。） By Mr。 Heffernan's retirement in early 1990 H。 H。 Brown had three plants in the United States and one in Canada； employed close to 2；000 people； and earned about 25 million annually before taxes。
我们在1991年做了一件大型的购并案，那就是买下布朗鞋业，这背后有一段有趣的故事，1927年时有一位29岁的年轻商人…Ray Heffernan以10；000美元买下这家公司，并把它搬到麻赛诸赛州，从此展开长达62年的事业（当然同时他还有其它追求的目标，高龄90岁的他现在还在加入新的高尔夫球俱乐部），等1990年Heffernan先生宣布退休时，布朗鞋业在美国已有三座工厂，还有另外一座在加拿大，每年的税前获利约有2；500万美元。
Along the way； Frances Heffernan； one of Ray's daughters； married Frank Rooney； who was sternly advised by Mr。 Heffernan before the wedding that he had better forget any ideas he might have about working for his father…in…law。 That was one of Mr。 Heffernan's few mistakes： Frank went on to bee CEO of Melville Shoe （now Melville Corp。）。 During his 23 years as boss； from 1964 through 1986； Melville's earnings averaged more than 20％ on equity and its stock （adjusted for splits） rose from 16 to 960。 And a few years after Frank retired； Mr。 Heffernan； who had fallen ill； asked him to run Brown。
这期间Heffernan的一个女儿Frances嫁给了Frank Rooney，当时Heffernan严正地告诉他的女婿最好断了想要参与经营布朗鞋业的念头，但这却是Heffernan先生所犯下的少数错误之一，Frank后来跑到另外一家鞋业Melville担任CEO，在他从1964年到1986年担任主管的期间，Mellville每年的股东权益报酬高达20％，而股价更从16元涨到960元（经过还原后），而在Frank退休多年后，Heffernan先生因为生病，才叫Frank回来经营布朗鞋业。
After Mr。 Heffernan died late in 1990； his family decided to sell the pany … and here we got lucky。