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After Mr。 Heffernan died late in 1990； his family decided to sell the pany … and here we got lucky。 I had known Frank for a few years but not well enough for him to think of Berkshire as a possible buyer。 He instead gave the assignment of selling Brown to a major investment banker； which failed also to think of us。 But last spring Frank was playing golf in Florida with John Loomis； a long…time friend of mine as well as a Berkshire shareholder； who is always on the alert for something that might fit us。 Hearing about the impending sale of Brown； John told Frank that the pany should be right up Berkshire's alley； and Frank promptly gave me a call。 I thought right away that we would make a deal and before long it was done。
之后在1990年Heffernan先生过世，他的家人决定要把公司卖掉，所以我们的机会就来了，那时我们认识Frank也有好几年了，但没有好到让他认为Berkshire是布朗鞋业合适的买主，反而他把卖公司的事交给一家投资银行来负责，可想而知投资银行绝对不会想到我们，但是就在去年春天，Frank跟John Loomis一起到佛罗里达打高尔夫球，John是我多年的好友，同时也是Berkshire的股东，他总是随时注意有没有适合我们投资的对象，在听到布朗鞋业即将出售的消息之后，John告诉Frank说这家公司应该要投到Berkshire的麾下，而Frank也从善如流马上打了通电话给我，我当下觉得我们应该可以谈得成，果然在不久之后，整个交易便确定了。
Much of my enthusiasm for this purchase came from Frank's willingness to continue as CEO。 Like most of our managers； he has no financial need to work but does so because he loves the game and likes to excel。 Managers of this stripe cannot be 〃hired〃 in the normal sense of the word。 What we must do is provide a concert hall in which business artists of this class will wish to perform。
我之所以会对这项交易这么感兴趣的原因在于Frank愿意继续留下来担任CEO，就像我们其它所有经理人一样，他不需要因为经济因素而继续工作，但他确实热爱这项任务且做的很好，这类型的经理人可不是三言两语就可以〃请〃得到的，我们能做的就是尽量提供一个够水准的演奏厅，让这些商业界的天才艺术家可以在这里好好发挥。
Brown （which； by the way； has no connection to Brown Shoe of St。 Louis） is the leading North American manufacturer of work shoes and boots； and it has a history of earning unusually fine margins on sales and assets。 Shoes are a tough business … of the billion pairs purchased in the United States each year； about 85％ are imported … and most manufacturers in the industry do poorly。 The wide range of styles and sizes that producers offer causes inventories to be heavy； substantial capital is also tied up in receivables。 In this kind of environment； only outstanding managers like Frank and the group developed by Mr。 Heffernan can prosper。
布朗（跟圣路易的布朗鞋子完全没有关系）是北美地区工作鞋与工作靴的领导品牌，同时拥有非凡的销售毛利与资产报酬，事实上鞋子产业竞争相当地激烈，在全美一年10亿双的采购量中，大约有85％是从国外进口，而产业中大部分的制造工厂表现都乏善可陈，由于款式与型号繁多导致库存压力相当重，同时资金也绑在大笔的应收帐款，在这样的环境底下，只有像Frank这样优秀的经理人再加上Heffernan先生所建立这样的事业才有可能生存。
A distinguishing characteristic of H。 H。 Brown is one of the most unusual pensation systems I've encountered … but one that warms my heart： A number of key managers are paid an annual salary of 7；800； to which is added a designated percentage of the profits of the pany after these are reduced by a charge for capital employed。 These managers therefore truly stand in the shoes of owners。 In contrast； most managers talk the talk but don't walk the walk； choosing instead to employ pensation systems that are long on carrots but short on sticks （and that almost invariably treat equity capital as if it were cost…free）。 The arrangement at Brown； in any case； has served both the pany and its managers exceptionally well； which should be no surprise： Managers eager to bet heavily on their abilities usually have plenty of ability to bet on。
布朗鞋业有一个相当与众不同的特点，那就是它的薪资奖赏制度与我之前看到的完全不同，不过却深得我心，公司主要的经理人每年的底薪只有7；800美元，之后再依据公司每年的获利，乘以一个事先订定的百分比，并扣除运用资金的成本，因此我们可以说这些经理人完全是与股东站在同一条船上，相对于一般说归说、做归做的经理人，选择运用红萝卜长，杆子短的薪资报酬制度（总是把股东所提供的资金当作是不用成本的），事实证明布朗鞋业这样的安排，不论在任何情况下，对于公司与经理人都绝对有利，胆敢依恃个人能力来做赌注的经理人，绝对有相当的能力来下赌。
It's discouraging to note that though we have on four occasions made major purchases of panies whose sellers were represented by prominent investment banks； we were in only one of these instances contacted by the investment bank。 In the other three cases； I myself or a friend initiated the transaction at some point after the investment bank had solicited its own list of prospects。 We would love to see an intermediary earn its fee by thinking of us … and therefore repeat here what we're looking for：
很令人失望的是虽然我们有四个主要的投资个案的卖方是透过著名的投资银行所介绍，但却只有一家是真正由投资银行主动联系我们的，其它三个案子都是在投资银行寻求其名单上的买主不成后，由我本人或是朋友促成最后的交易，我们很希望中间人在赚取其佣金收入的同时，还能够想到我们的存在，以下就是我们想要找的企业条件
（1） Large purchases （at least 10 million of after…tax earnings）；
（2） Demonstrated consistent earning power （future projections are of little interest to us； nor are 〃turnaround〃 situations）；
（3） Businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt；
（4） Management in place （we can't supply it）；
（5） Simple businesses （if there's lots of technology； we won't understand it）；
（6） An offering price （we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking； even preliminarily； about a transaction when price is unknown）。
（1）巨额交易（每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元）
（2）持续稳定获利（我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣）
（3）高股东报酬率（并且甚少举债）
（4）具备管理阶层（我们无法提供）
（5）简单的企业（若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂）
（6）合理的价格（在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间）
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers。 We can promise plete confidentiality and a very fast answer … customarily within five minutes … as to whether we're interested。 （With Brown； we didn't even need to take five。） We prefer to buy for cash； but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give。
我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣（通常不超过五分钟），像是布朗鞋业这样的案子根本就不要五分钟，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the pattern through which we acquired Nebraska Furniture Mart； Fechheimer's and Borsheim's。 In cases like these； the pany's owner…managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash； sometimes for themselves； but often for their families or inactive shareholders。 At the same time； these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their panies just as they have in the past。 We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives and we invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past。
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像B太太… Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't e close to meeting our tests： We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies； a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels。 A line from a country song expresses our feeling about new ventures； turnarounds； or auction…like sales： 〃When the phone don't ring； you'll know it's me。〃
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，对于这类的事业，有首乡村歌曲其中的一句歌词最能描述我们的感觉，「若电话不响，你就知道那是我」。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above； we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large； but not controlling； blocks of stock parable to those we hold in Capital Cities； Salomon； Gillette； USAir； Champion； and American Express。 We are not interested； however； in receiving suggestions about purchases we might make in the general stock market。
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，就像我们在资本城、所罗门、吉列、美国航空、冠军企业与美国运通这几个Case一样的公司，不过对于一般直接从股票市场上买进股份的建议我们，则一点兴趣都没有。
Insurance Operations保险业营运
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property…casualty insurance industry：
下表是产物意外险业的最新的几项重要指数
Yearly Change bined Ratio Yearly Change Inflation Rate in Premiums After Policyholder in Incurred Measured by
Written （％） Dividends Losses （％） GDP Deflator （％）
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990（Revised） 1991 （Est。）
3。8 3。7 5。0 8。5 22。1 22。2 9。4 4。4 3。2 4。4 3。1
106。0 109。6 112。0 118。0 116。3 108。0 104。6 105。4 109。6 109。6 109。1
6。5 8。4 6。8 16。9 16。1 13。5 7。8 5。5 4。8 4。8 2。9
10。0 6。2 4。0 4。5 3。7 2。7 3。1 3。9 4。1 4。1 3。7
The bined ratio represents total insurance costs （losses incurred plus expenses） pared to revenue from premiums： A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit； and one above 100 indicates a loss。 The higher the ratio； the worse the year。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107 … 111 range typically produces an overall break…even result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow at close to 10％ annually； even in periods when general inflation runs considerably lower。 （Over the last 25 years； incurred losses have in reality grown at a still faster rate； 11％。） If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，（事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11％的速度在成长），若是保费收入还是大幅落后于10％的门槛，承保损失一定会继续增加。
However； the industry's tendency to under…reserve when business turns bad may obscure the picture for a time … and that could well describe the situation last year。 Though premiums did not e close to growing 10％； the bined ratio failed to deteriorate as I had expected but instead slightly improved。 Loss…reserve data for the industry indicate that there is reason to be skeptical of that oute； and it may turn out that 1991's ratio should have been worse than was reported。 In the long run； of course； trouble awaits managements that paper over operating problems with accounting maneuvers。 Eventually； managements of this kind achieve the same result as the seriously…ill patient who tells his doctor： 〃I can't afford the operation； but would you accept a small payment to touch up the x…rays？〃
然而产业普遍存在损失准备提列不足的现象，使得企业前景不佳的情况可以获得暂时的掩饰，这正是去年度所发生的事，虽然保费收入成长不到10％，但综合比率非但没有像我所预测地那样恶化反而还有点改善，损失准备的统计资料显示这样的现象实在是相当令人怀疑，这种结果也可能导致1991年的比率将更进一步恶化，当然就长期而言，这些利用会计手法掩盖营运问题的经理人还是要面对真正的麻烦，到最后这类的经理人会变得跟许多病入膏肓的病人对医生说的一样：「我实在是承受不起另一次手术，不过你是否可以考虑把我的X光片给补一补」。
Berkshire's insurance business has changed in ways that make bined ratios； our own or the industry's； largely irrelevant to our performance。 What counts with us is the 〃cost of funds developed from insurance；〃 or in the vernacular； 〃the cost of float。〃