按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
the study of Universal History； we should at least leave the firm； unconquerable faith that Reason
does exist there； and that the World of intelligence and conscious volition is not abandoned to
chance； but must show itself in the light of the self…cognisant Idea。 Yet I am not obliged to make
any such preliminary demand upon your faith。 What I have said thus provisionally； and what I shall
have further to say； is； even in reference to our branch of science； not to be regarded as
hypothetical； but as a summary view of the whole； the result of the investigation we are about to
pursue； a result which happens to be known to me； because I have traversed the entire field。 It is
only an inference from the history of the World； that its development has been a rational process；
that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World Spirit — that
Spirit whose nature is always one and the same； but which unfolds this its one nature in the
phenomena of the World's existence。 This must； as before stated； present itself as the ultimate
result of History。 But we have to take the latter as it is。 We must proceed historically —
empirically。 Among other precautions we must take care not to be misled by professed historians
who （especially among the Germans； and enjoying a considerable authority）； are chargeable with
the very procedure of which they accuse the Philosopher — introducing à priori inventions of
their own into the records of the Past。 It is； for example； a widely current fiction； that there was an
original primeval people； taught immediately by God； endowed with perfect insight and wisdom；
possessing a thorough knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual truth； that there have been such
or such sacerdotal peoples； or； to mention a more specific averment； that there was a Roman
Epos； from which the Roman historians derived the early annals of their city； &c。 Authorities of
this kind we leave to those talented historians by profession； among whom （in Germany at least）
their use is not unmon。 — We might then announce it as the first condition to be observed； that
we should faithfully adopt all that is historical。 But in such general expressions themselves； as
“faithfully” and “adopt；” lies the ambiguity。 Even the ordinary； the “impartial” historiographer；
who believes and professes that he maintains a simply receptive attitude； surrendering himself only
to the data supplied him — is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers。
He brings his categories with him； and sees the phenomena presented to his mental vision；
exclusively through these media。 And； especially in all that pretends to the name of science； it is
indispensable that Reason should not sleep — that reflection should be in full play。 To him who
looks upon the world rationally； the world in its turn； presents a rational aspect。 The relation is
mutual。 But the various exercises of reflection — the different points of view — the modes of
deciding the simple question of the relative importance of events （the first category that occupies
the attention of the historian）； do not belong to this place。
§ 14
I will only mention two phases and points of view that concern the generally diffused conviction
that Reason has ruled； and is still ruling in the world； and consequently in the world's history；
because they give us； at the same time； an opportunity for more closely investigating the question
that presents the greatest difficulty； and for indicating a branch of the subject； which will have to be
enlarged on in the sequel。
I。 Reason Governs the World
§ 15
One of these points is； that passage in history； which informs us that the Greek Anaxagoras was
the first to enunciate the doctrine that Understanding generally； or Reason； governs the world。 It is
not intelligence as self…conscious Reason； — not a Spirit as such that is meant； and we must clearly
distinguish these from each other。 The movement of the solar system takes place according to
unchangeable laws。 These laws are Reason； implicit in the phenomena in question。 But neither the
sun nor the plas； which revolve around it according to these laws； can be said to have any
consciousness of them。
§ 16
A thought of this kind； — that Nature is an embodiment of Reason； that it is unchangeably
subordinate to universal laws； appears nowise striking or strange to us。 We are accustomed to
such conceptions； and find nothing extraordinary in them。 And I have mentioned this extraordinary
occurrence； partly to show how history teaches； that ideas of this kind； which may seem trivial to
us； have not always been in the world； that on the contrary； such a thought makes an epoch in the
annals of human intelligence。 Aristotle says of Anaxagoras； as the originator of the thought in
question； that he appeared as a sober man among the drunken。 Socrates adopted the doctrine
from Anaxagoras； and it forthwith became the ruling idea in Philosophy； except in the school of
Epicurus； who ascribed all events to chance。 “I was delighted with the sentiment；” — Plato
makes Socrates say — “and hoped I had found a teacher who would show me Nature in harmony
with Reason； who would demonstrate in each particular phenomenon its specific aim； and in the
whole； the grand object of the Universe。 I would not have surrendered this hope for a great deal。
But how very much was I disappointed； when； having zealously applied myself to the writings of
Anaxagoras； I found that he adduces only external causes； such as Atmosphere； Ether； Water；
and the like。” It is evident that the defect which Socrates plains of respecting Anaxagoras's
doctrine； does not concern the principle itself； but the shorting of the propounder in applying it
to Nature in the concrete。 Nature is not deduced from that principle： the latter remains in fact a
mere abstraction； inasmuch as the former is not prehended and exhibited as a development of
it； — an organisation produced by and from Reason。 I wish； at the very outset； to call your
attention to the important difference between a conception； a principle； a truth limited to an
abstract form and its determinate application； and concrete development。 This distinction affects
the whole fabric of philosophy； and among other bearings of it there is one to which we shall have
to revert at the close of our view of Universal History； in investigating the aspect of political affairs
in the most recent period。
§ 17
We have next to notice the rise of this idea — that Reason directs the World — in connection with
a further application of it； well known to us； — in the form； viz。 of the religious truth； that the
world is not abandoned to chance and external contingent causes； but that a Providence controls
it。 I stated above； that I would not make a demand on your faith； in regard to the principle
announced。 Yet I might appeal to your belief in it； in this religious aspect； if； as a general rule； the
nature of philosophical science allowed it to attach authority to presuppositions。 To put it in
another shape； — this appeal is forbidden； because the science of which we have to treat；
proposes itself to furnish the proof （not indeed of the abstract Truth of the doctrine； but） of its
correctness as pared with facts。 The truth； then； that a Providence （that of God） presides over
the events of the World — consorts with the proposition in question； for Divine Providence is
Wisdom； endowed with an infinite Power which realises its aim； viz。 the absolute rational…design of
the World。 Reason is Thought conditioning itself with perfect freedom。 But a difference — rather a
contradiction — will manifest itself； between this belief and our principle； just as was the case in
reference to the demand made by Socrates in the case of Anaxagoras's dictum。 For that belief is
similarly indefinite； it is what is called a belief in a general Providence； and is not followed out into
definite application； or displayed in its bearing on the grand total — the entire course of human
history。 But to explain History is to depict the passions of mankind； the genius； the active powers；
that play their part on the great stage； and the providentially determined process which these
exhibit； constitutes what is generally called the “plan” of Providence。 Yet it is this very plan which
is supposed to be concealed from our view： which it is deemed presumption； even to wish to
recognise。 The ignorance of Anaxagoras； as to how intelligence reveals itself in actual existence；
was ingenuous。 Neither in his consciousness； nor in that of Greece at large； had that thought been
further expanded。 He had not attained the power to apply his general principle to the concrete； so
as to deduce the latter from the former。 It was Socrates who took the first step in prehending
the union of the Concrete with the Universal。 Anaxagoras； then； did not take up a hostile position
towards such an application。 The mon belief in Providence does； at least it opposes the use of
the principle on the large scale； and denies the possibility of discerning the plan of Providence。 In
isolated cases this plan is supposed to be manifest。 Pious persons are encouraged to recognise in
particular circumstances； something more than mere chance； to acknowledge the guiding hand of
God； e。g。 when help has unexpectedly e to an individual in great perplexity and need。 But
these instances。 of providential design are of a limited kind； and concern the acplishment of
nothing more than the desires of the individual in question。 But in the history of the World； the
Individuals we have to do with are Peoples； Totalities that are States。 We cannot； therefore； be
satisfied with what we may call this “peddling” view of Providence； to which the belief alluded to
limits itself。 Equally unsatisfactory is the merely abstract； undefined belief in a Providence； when
that belief is not brought to bear upon the details of the process which it conducts。 On the contrary
our earnest endeavour must be directed to the recognition of the ways of Providence； the means it
uses； and the historical phenomena in which it manifests itself； and we must show their connection
with the general principle above mentioned。 But in noticing the recognition of the plan of Divine
Providence generally； I have implicitly touched upon a prominent question of the day； viz。 that of
the possibility of knowing God： or rather — since public opinion has ceased to allow it to be a
matter of question — the doctrine that it is impossible to know God。 In direct contravention of
what is manded in holy Scripture as the highest duty； — that we should not merely love； but
know God； — the prevalent dogma involves the denial of what is there said； viz。 that it is the Spirit
（der Geist） that leads into Truth； knows all things； perates even into the deep things of the
Godhead。 While the Divine Being is thus placed beyond our knowledge； and outside the limit of all
human things； we have the convenient licence of wandering as far as we list； in the direction of our
own fancies。 We are freed from the obligation to refer our knowledge to the Divine and True。 On
the other hand； the vanity and egotism which characterise it find； in this false position； ample
justification and the pious modesty which puts far from it the knowledge of God； can well estimate
how much furtherance thereby accrues to its own wayward and vain strivings。 I have been
unwilling to leave out of sight the connection between our thesis … that Reason governs and has
governed the World — and the question of the possibility of a Knowledge of God； chiefly that I
might not lose the opportunity of mentioning the imputation against Philosophy of being shy of
noticing religious truths； or of having occasion to be so in which is insinuated the suspicion that it
has anything but a clear conscience in the presence of these truths。 So far from this being the case；
the fact is； that in recent times Philosophy has been obliged to defend the domain of religion
against the