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phenomenon； I made mere illusory appearance。* But this will not
happen； because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous
intuitions。 On the contrary； if we ascribe objective reality to
these forms of representation； it bees impossible to avoid changing
everything into mere appearance。 For if we regard space and time as
properties； which must be found in objects as things in themselves； as
sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence； and reflect
on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved；
inasmuch as we are pelled to admit the existence of two infinite
things； which are nevertheless not substances； nor anything really
inhering in substances； nay； to admit that they are the necessary
conditions of the existence of all things； and moreover； that they
must continue to exist； although all existing things were annihilated…
we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere
illusory appearances。 Nay； even our own existence； which would in this
case depend upon the self…existent reality of such a mere nonentity as
time； would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance… an
absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of。
*The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object
itself in relation to our sensuous faculty； for example； the red
colour or the perfume to the rose。 But （illusory） appearance never can
be attributed as a predicate to an object； for this very reason；
that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it
only in relation to our sensuous faculty； or to the subject in
general； e。g。； the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn。
That which is never to be found in the object itself； but always in
the relation of the object to the subject； and which moreover is
inseparable from our representation of the object； we denominate
phenomenon。 Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly
attributed to objects of the senses as such； and in this there is no
illusion。 On the contrary； if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing
in itself； or to Saturn his handles； or extension to all external
objects； considered as things in themselves； without regarding the
determinate relation of these objects to the subject； and without
limiting my judgement to that relation… then； and then only； arises
illusion。
IV。 In natural theology； where we think of an object… God… which
never can be an object of intuition to us； and even to himself can
never be an object of sensuous intuition； we carefully avoid
attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time… and
intuition all his cognition must be； and not thought； which always
includes limitation。 But with what right can we do this if we make
them forms of objects as things in themselves； and such； moreover；
as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence
of things； even though the things themselves were annihilated？ For
as conditions of all existence in general； space and time must be
conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also。 But if we do
not thus make them objective forms of all things； there is no other
way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of
intuition… external and internal； which is called sensuous； because it
is not primitive； that is； is not such as gives in itself the
existence of the object of the intuition （a mode of intuition which；
so far as we can judge； can belong only to the Creator）； but is
dependent on the existence of the object； is possible； therefore； only
on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is
affected by the object。
It is； moreover； not necessary that we should limit the mode of
intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man。 It may
well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this
respect agree with man （though as to this we cannot decide）； but
sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be
sensibility； for this very reason； that it is a deduced （intuitus
derivativus）； and not an original （intuitus originarius）； consequently
not an intellectual intuition； and this intuition； as such； for
reasons above mentioned； seems to belong solely to the Supreme
Being； but never to a being dependent； quoad its existence； as well as
its intuition （which its existence determines and limits relatively to
given objects）。 This latter remark； however； must be taken only as
an illustration； and not as any proof of the truth of our
aesthetical theory。
SS 10 Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic。
We have now pletely before us one part of the solution of the
grand general problem of transcendental philosophy； namely； the
question： 〃How are synthetical propositions a priori possible？〃 That
is to say； we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori
intuitions； namely； space and time； in which we find； when in a
judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception；
something which is not discoverable in that conception； but is
certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the
conception； and can be united synthetically with it。 But the
judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make； never
reach farther than to objects of the senses； and are valid only for
objects of possible experience。
INTRO
SECOND PART。 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC。
INTRODUCTION。 Idea of a Transcendental Logic。
I。 Of Logic in General。
Our knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind； first of
which is the faculty or power of receiving representations
（receptivity for impressions）； the second is the power of cognizing by
means of these representations （spontaneity in the production of
conceptions）。 Through the first an object is given to us； through
the second； it is； in relation to the representation （which is a
mere determination of the mind）； thought。 Intuition and conceptions
constitute； therefore； the elements of all our knowledge； so that
neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding
to them； nor intuition without conceptions； can afford us a cognition。
Both are either pure or empirical。 They are。 empirical； when sensation
（which presupposes the actual presence of the object） is contained
in them； and pure； when no sensation is mixed with the representation。
Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition。 Pure
intuition consequently contains merely the form under which
something is intuited； and pure conception only the form of the
thought of an object。 Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are
possible a priori； the empirical only a posteriori。
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
impressions； in so far as it is in some way affected； and； on the
other hand； we call the faculty of spontaneously producing
representations； or the spontaneity of cognition； understanding。 Our
nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other
than sensuous； that is； it contains only the mode in which we are
affected by objects。 On the other hand； the faculty of thinking the
object of sensuous intuition is the understanding。 Neither of these
faculties has a preference over the other。 Without the sensuous
faculty no object would be given to us； and without the
understanding no object would be thought。 Thoughts without content are
void； intuitions without conceptions； blind。 Hence it is as
necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous （that is； to
join to them the object in intuition）； as to make its intuitions
intelligible （that is； to bring them under conceptions）。 Neither of
these faculties can exchange its proper function。 Understanding cannot
intuite； and the sensuous faculty cannot think。 in no other way than
from the united operation of both； can knowledge arise。 But no one
ought； on this account； to overlook the difference of the elements
contributed by each； we have rather great reason carefully to separate
and distinguish them。 We therefore distinguish the science of the laws
of sensibility； that is； aesthetic； from the science of the laws of
the understanding； that is； logic。
Now； logic in its turn may be considered as twofold… namely； as
logic of the general； or of the particular use of the understanding。
The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought； without
which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible； and gives
laws therefore to the understanding； without regard to the
difference of objects on which it may be employed。 The logic of the
particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct
thinking upon a particular class of objects。 The former may be
called elemental logic… the latter； the organon of this or that
particular science。 The latter is for the most part employed in the
schools； as a propaedeutic to the sciences； although； indeed；
according to the course of human reason； it is the last thing we
arrive at； when the science has been already matured； and needs only
the finishing touches towards its correction and pletion； for our
knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably
extensive and plete before we can indicate the laws by which a
science of these objects can be established。
General logic is again either pure or applied。 In the former； we
abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is
exercised； for example； the influence of the senses； the play of the
fantasy or imagination； the laws of the memory； the force of habit； of
inclination； etc。； consequently also； the sources of prejudice… in a
word； we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise；
because these causes regard the understanding under certain
circumstances of its application； and； to the knowledge of them
experience is required。 Pure general logic has to do； therefore；
merely with pure a priori principles； and is a canon of
understanding and reason； but only in respect of the formal part of
their use； be the content what it may； empirical or transcendental。
General logic is called applied； when it is directed to the laws of
the use of the understanding； under the subjective empirical
conditions which psychology teaches us。 It has therefore empirical
principles； although； at the same time； it is in so far general；
that it applies to the exercise of the understanding； without regard
to the difference of objects。 On this account； moreover； it is neither
a canon of the understanding in general； nor an organon of a
particular science； but merely a cathartic of the human understanding。
In general logic； therefore； that part which constitutes pure
logic must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes
applied （though still general） logic。 The former alone is properly
science； although short and dry； as the methodical exposition of an
elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be。 In this；
therefore； logicians must always bear in mind two rules：
1。 As general logic； it makes abstraction of all content of the
cognition of the understanding； and of the difference of objects；
and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought。
2。 As pure logic； it has no empirical principles； and consequently
draws nothing （contrary to the mon persuasion） from psychology；
which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding。 It
is a demonstrated doctrine； and everything in it must be certain
pletely a priori。
What I called applied logic （contrary to the mon acceptation of
this term； according to which it should contain certain exercises
for the scholar； for which pure logic gives the rules）； is a
representation of the understanding； and of the rules of its necessary
employment in concreto； that is to say； under the accidental
conditions of the subject； which may either hinder or promote this
employment； and which are all given only empirically。 Thus applied
logic treats of attention； its impediments and consequences； of the
origin of error； of the state of doubt； hesitation； conviction；
etc。； and to it is related pure general logic in the same way that
pure morality； which contains only the necessary moral laws of a
free will； is related to practical ethics； which con