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to us in intuition； but that only as phenomena； for it is only of
phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition。
This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition； which is
possible and necessary a priori； may be called figurative （synthesis
speciosa）； in contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere
category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general； and
is called connection or conjunction of the understanding （synthesis
intellectualis）。 Both are transcendental； not merely because they
themselves precede a priori all experience； but also because they form
the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori。
But the figurative synthesis； when it has relation only to the
originally synthetical unity of apperception； that is to the
transcendental unity cogitated in the categories； must； to be
distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction； be entitled
the transcendental synthesis of imagination。 Imagination is the
faculty of representing an object even without its presence in
intuition。 Now； as all our intuition is sensuous； imagination； by
reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a
corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding；
belongs to sensibility。 But in so far as the synthesis of the
imagination is an act of spontaneity； which is determinative； and not；
like sense； merely determinable； and which is consequently able to
determine sense a priori； according to its form； conformably to the
unity of apperception； in so far is the imagination a faculty of
determining sensibility a priori； and its synthesis of intuitions
according to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of
the imagination。 It is an operation of the understanding on
sensibility； and the first application of the understanding to objects
of possible intuition； and at the same time the basis for the exercise
of the other functions of that faculty。 As figurative； it is
distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis； which is
produced by the understanding alone； without the aid of imagination。
Now； in so far as imagination is spontaneity； I sometimes call it also
the productive imagination； and distinguish it from the
reproductive； the synthesis of which is subject entirely to
empirical laws； those of association； namely； and which； therefore；
contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a
priori cognition； and for this reason belongs not to transcendental
philosophy； but to psychology。
We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox
which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal
sense （SS 6）； namely… how this sense represents us to our own
consciousness； only as we appear to ourselves； not as we are in
ourselves； because； to wit； we intuite ourselves only as we are
inwardly affected。 Now this appears to be contradictory； inasmuch as
we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves； and therefore in the
systems of psychology； the internal sense is monly held to be one
with the faculty of apperception； while we； on the contrary； carefully
distinguish them。
That which determines the internal sense is the understanding； and
its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition； that is；
of bringing this under an apperception （upon which rests the
possibility of the understanding itself）。 Now； as the human
understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition； and is unable
to exercise such a power； in order to conjoin； as it were； the
manifold of its own intuition； the synthesis of understanding is；
considered per se； nothing but the unity of action； of which； as such；
it is self…conscious； even apart from sensibility； by which； moreover；
it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the
manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of
sensuous intuition。 Thus； under the name of a transcendental synthesis
of imagination； the understanding exercises an activity upon the
passive subject； whose faculty it is； and so we are right in saying
that the internal sense is affected thereby。 Apperception and its
synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal
sense。 The former； as the source of all our synthetical conjunction；
applies； under the name of the categories； to the manifold of
intuition in general； prior to all sensuous intuition of objects。
The internal sense； on the contrary； contains merely the form of
intuition； but without any synthetical conjunction of the manifold
therein； and consequently does not contain any determined intuition；
which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of
the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination （synthetical
influence of the understanding on the internal sense）； which I have
named figurative synthesis。
This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves。 We cannot
cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought； nor a
circle without describing it； nor represent the three dimensions of
space without drawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to
one another。 We cannot even cogitate time； unless； in drawing a
straight line （which is to serve as the external figurative
representation of time）； we fix our attention on the act of the
synthesis of the manifold； whereby we determine successively the
internal sense； and thus attend also to the succession of this
determination。 Motion as an act of the subject （not as a determination
of an object）；* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space；
if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by
which we determine the internal sense according to its form； is that
which produces the conception of succession。 The understanding；
therefore； does by no means find in the internal sense any such
synthesis of the manifold； but produces it； in that it affects this
sense。 At the same time； how 〃I who think〃 is distinct from the 〃I〃
which intuites itself （other modes of intuition being cogitable as
at least possible）； and yet one and the same with this latter as the
same subject； how； therefore； I am able to say： 〃I； as an intelligence
and thinking subject； cognize myself as an object thought； so far as I
am； moreover； given to myself in intuition… only； like other
phenomena； not as I am in myself； and as considered by the
understanding； but merely as I appear〃… is a question that has in it
neither more nor less difficulty than the question… 〃How can I be an
object to myself？〃 or this… 〃How I can be an object of my own
intuition and internal perceptions？〃 But that such must be the fact；
if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of
external sense； can be clearly proved by the consideration that we
cannot represent time； which is not an object of external intuition；
in any other way than under the image of a line； which we draw in
thought； a mode of representation without which we could not cognize
the unity of its dimension； and also that we are necessitated to
take our determination of periods of time； or of points of time； for
all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in
outward things。 It follows that we must arrange the determinations
of the internal sense； as phenomena in time； exactly in the same
manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space。 And
consequently； if we grant； respecting this latter； that by means of
them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally；
we must also confess； with regard to the internal sense； that by means
of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by
ourselves； in other words； as regards internal intuition； we cognize
our own subject only as phenomenon； and not as it is in itself。*＇2＇
*Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science；
consequently not to geometry； because； that a thing is movable
cannot be known a priori； but only from experience。 But motion；
considered as the description of a space； is a pure act of the
successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition by means of
productive imagination； and belongs not only to geometry； but even
to transcendental philosophy。
*＇2＇ I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in
admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves。 Every
act of attention exemplifies it。 In such an act the understanding
determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which
it cogitates； conformably to the internal intuition which
corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding。 How
much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be able to
perceive in himself。
SS 21
On the other hand； in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold
content of representations； consequently in the synthetical unity of
apperception； I am conscious of myself； not as I appear to myself； nor
as I am in myself； but only that 〃I am。〃 This representation is a
thought； not an intuition。 Now； as in order to cognize ourselves； in
addition to the act of thinking； which subjects the manifold of
every possible intuition to the unity of apperception； there is
necessary a determinate mode of intuition； whereby this manifold is
given； although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon
（much less mere illusion）； the determination of my existence* Can only
take place conformably to the form of the internal sense； according to
the particular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given
in internal intuition； and I have therefore no knowledge of myself
as I am； but merely as I appear to myself。 The consciousness of self
is thus very far from a knowledge of self； in which I do not use the
categories； whereby I cogitate an object； by means of the
conjunction of the manifold in one apperception。 In the same way as
I require； for the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from
myself； not only the thought of an object in general （in the
category）； but also an intuition by which to determine that general
conception； in the same way do I require； in order to the cognition of
myself； not only the consciousness of myself or the thought that I
think myself； but in addition an intuition of the manifold in
myself； by which to determine this thought。 It is true that I exist as
an intelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of
conjunction or synthesis； but subjected in relation to the manifold
which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction
called the internal sense。 My intelligence （that is； I） can render
that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only according to the
relations of time； which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the
conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself in
respect to an intuition （which cannot possibly be intellectual； nor
given by the understanding）； only as it appears to itself； and not
as it would cognize itself； if its intuition were intellectual。
*The 〃I think〃 expresses the act of determining my own existence。 My
existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness； but the
mode in which I must determine my existence； that is； the mode in
which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence； is not
thereby given。 For this purpose intuition of self is required； and
this intuition possesses a form given a priori； namely； time； which is
sensuous； and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable。 Now；
as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the
determining in me （of the spontaneity of which I am conscious）；
prior to the act of determination； in the same manner as time gives
the determinable； it is clear that I am unable to determine my own
existence as that of a spontaneous being； but I am only able to
represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought； that is； of my
determination； and my existence remains ever determinable in a
purely sensuous manner； that is to say； like the existence of a
phenomenon。 But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself
an intelligence。
Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible
employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions
of the Un